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Abstract
Language learners must learn the meanings of many thousands of words, de-
spite those words occurring in complex environments in which infinitely many
meanings might be inferred by the learner as a word’s true meaning. This
problem of infinite referential uncertainty is often attributed to Willard Van
Orman Quine. We provide a mathematical formalisation of an ideal cross-
situational learner attempting to learn under infinite referential uncertainty,
and identify conditions under which word learning is possible. As Quine’s
intuitions suggest, learning under infinite uncertainty is in fact possible, pro-
vided that learners have some means of ranking candidate word meanings in
terms of their plausibility; furthermore, our analysis shows that this rank-
ing could in fact be exceedingly weak, implying that constraints which allow
learners to infer the plausibility of candidate word meanings could themselves
be weak. This approach lifts the burden of explanation from ‘smart’ word
learning constraints in learners, and suggests a programme of research into
weak, unreliable, probabilistic constraints on the inference of word meaning
in real word learners.
Keywords: word learning, cross-situational learning, Quine’s Problem
1. Word learning and indeterminacy of meaning
Children are prolific word learners, learning around 60,000 words by age
18 (Bloom, 2000). Their prodigious word-learning abilities are even more
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remarkable when we consider some of the challenges facing the word learner,
including the need to segment words from connected speech (Sa↵ran et al.,
1996), to generalise word forms across speakers (Henderson and Graham,
2005), and to identify the syntactic properties of those words (Mintz, 2002).
In this paper we focus on another aspect of the word learning problem: in-
ferring word meaning. Children will typically encounter words in a complex
environment. How do they know what these words mean? Every time a word
is used, there may be many meanings which a learner could infer as the word’s
true meaning: the learner will face referential uncertainty. As discussed be-
low, a widespread observation in the literature is that there are potentially
infinitelymany candidate meanings which would be consistent with any given
situation of usage. This idea, which we will refer to as infinite referential un-
certainty, is commonly attributed to Quine (1960), although on our reading
(discussed below) we think Quine’s central point was rather di↵erent.
Regardless of its provenance, the infinite referential uncertainty hypoth-
esis has been crucial in the development of two approaches to word learning,
which di↵er in emphasis but are entirely compatible in content. One position
emphasises the importance of heuristics which guide word learning, serving
to reduce referential uncertainty and allow the learner to make accurate in-
ferences about word meaning. These heuristics might include: exploiting the
attentional focus of a speaker (Tomasello and Farrar, 1986); the assumption
that words refer to whole objects (Macnamara, 1972); using knowledge of
the meaning of other words to constrain hypotheses about the meaning of
a new word, for example by assuming that words have mutually exclusive
meanings (Markman and Wachtel, 1988); using argument structure and syn-
tactic context to constrain the meaning of new words (Gillette et al., 1999).
Heuristic-driven accounts emphasise how such constraints enable learners to
eliminate uncertainty about word meaning and form good hypotheses about
word meaning on even a single exposure to a word.
In the strongest accounts, these heuristics are hypothesised to eliminate
all uncertainty. However, the possibility that word learners may be con-
fronted with some residual referential uncertainty even after these heuris-
tics have done their work has driven a recent burst of interest in a second
approach to word learning, emphasising integration of information across
multiple exposures as a means for learning in the face of referential uncer-
tainty. Cross-situational learning comes in various flavours, from the classic
formulation provided by e.g. Siskind (1996) to associationist treatments (Yu
and Smith, 2007) to more minimal accounts (Smith et al., 2011; Medina
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et al., 2011). For instance, in its most powerful instantiation (e.g. Siskind,
1996), cross-situational learning involves tracking the set of meanings which
has been consistently inferred on every exposure to some target word: the
word’s true meaning should be a member of this set, which can be winnowed
down across a series of exposures until it includes only the true meaning.
Cross-situational learning accounts typically assume the presence of heuris-
tics which serve to reduce referential uncertainty to manageable levels: rather
than replacing heuristics, the contribution of this research is to explore the
extent to which word learning is possible even given some residual (i.e. non-
zero, but typically small) referential uncertainty.
Focussing on the interaction between heuristic and cross-situational ap-
proaches, in previous work (Blythe et al., 2010) we applied mathematical
techniques to quantify what residual level of referential uncertainty a cross-
situational learner can tolerate and still learn a large lexicon in a reasonable
timeframe. Our previous work focussed on calculating learning times for
lexicons given finite meaning spaces and finite levels of referential uncer-
tainty. In this paper we apply similar techniques to tackle the problem of
cross-situational learning for infinite meaning spaces under infinite referential
uncertainty. In doing so, we seek to address what is often (perhaps rather
loosely) called “Quine’s Problem” or “the gavagai problem”, the notion that
word learning under infinite referential uncertainty is impossible. We show
that word learning under such conditions is in principle possible, provided
that learners have heuristics which at least rank the plausibility of each can-
didate meaning at every exposure. Thus, as in fact envisaged by Quine in
his exposition of the indeterminacy of translation, word learning is possible
if learners know, of the infinitely many possible meanings a word could have
on any given situation of usage, how plausible each of those meanings are,
and that some are more plausible than others. Within this very general set of
conditions, given enough time, cross-situational learning can be used to elim-
inate uncertainty. Furthermore, cross-situational learning will in principle be
possible even if the learner’s heuristics only impose very weak constraints on
the ranking in terms of plausibility. This work therefore suggests similar con-
clusions to our previous work exploring finite referential uncertainty: word
learning heuristics can in principle be far weaker than previously suggested
and still allow word learning — in fact, those heuristics can be so weak as
to admit infinitely many possible meanings on any given exposure to a word,
which renders single-exposure word learning impossible. Importantly, we
therefore directly overturn the commonly-held assumption that word learn-
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ing is impossible in the face of infinite referential uncertainty. Furthermore,
the fact that word-learning heuristics which provide only weak constraints
on possible word meanings can nonetheless allow word learning has poten-
tial implications for our understanding of the heuristics and cognitive biases
underpinning word learning, and therefore on the empirical research attempt-
ing to uncover those biases. Firstly, this moves the explanatory burden from
‘smart’ inference by learners to ‘dumb’ crunching of cross-situational statis-
tics, therefore requiring us to assume less of word learners in terms of their
ability to accurately infer word meaning. Second, word learning heuristics
do not need to allow learners to make good guesses on a single exposure to a
word, which is a standard diagnostic in experimental research: weaker, un-
reliable, probabilistic heuristics can also play a key role, and therefore merit
investigation.
2. ‘Quine’s Problem’: learning under infinite uncertainty
Words are used in complex environments, and each word could label
any part of that complex environment. Worse, words can label objects and
events which are not perceivable to speaker or hearer (e.g. events which are
spatially or temporally distant from the time of speaking). And this is only
considering the obvious possibilities — words might have ‘strange’ meanings
(e.g. featuring disjunctions of the meanings of ‘normal’ words, meaning for
instance “a spark plug or an elephant”, “happiness or the number 17”, etc).
This idea, commonly attributed to Quine’s work on radical translation (of
which more below), appeals to the notion that on any situation there will be
infinitely many possible meanings that a novel word could have:
“Even if we restrict ourselves to middle-sized objects . . . we are
stuck with Quine’s problem, which is that children who hear a
word and know that it refers to a rabbit are still faced with an
indefinite number of possible meanings for this word” (Bloom,
2000, p. 56)
“Quine (1960) points out that there are an infinite number of true
facts about the world that a learner might need to entertain as
potential meanings of each utterance.” (Siskind, 1996, p. 45)
“Worse, or so philosophers tell us, learners might conjure up ab-
surd and endlessly di↵ering representations for those entities we
adults call ‘the cats.’” (Gillette et al., 1999, p. 136)
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“Famously articulated by Quine (1960), in any naming situation
there are infinite interpretations for an unknown word. Thus,
children face a daunting task of ambiguity resolution that they
must solve thousands of times.” (McMurray et al., 2012, p. 831)
“Word learning is often described as a di cult task because the
world o↵ers infants a seemingly infinite number of word-to-world
mappings in just one moment in time (Quine, 1960).” (Vlach and
Johnson, 2013, p. 375)
“Determining the meaning of a newly encountered word should
be extremely hard, due to the (in principle, unlimited) referential
uncertainty inherent in the task (Quine, 1960).” (Smith et al.,
2011, p. 480)
Such claims about infinite referential uncertainty are widespread in the
literature, and have played an important role in the development of the
theoretical motivation for research on the heuristics children use to elimi-
nate uncertainty during word learning: seminal papers on the Mutual Ex-
clusivity constraint (Markman and Wachtel, 1988), the shape bias (Landau
et al., 1988), joint attention (Baldwin, 1991), or lexical constraints in general
(Golinko↵ et al., 1994) make explicit reference to the problem of there being
“infinitely many” or “limitless” meanings a word could have. The consensus
is that word learning is impossible given this infinite uncertainty, and that
heuristics are required to eliminate some of these candidate meanings. In
this paper we explore the validity of this widely-held and entirely reason-
able intuition, and in particular show that it does not hold in a wide range
of well-defined circumstances. However, before doing so it is worth briefly
considering whether Quine’s Problem was actually posed by Quine.
3. Quine on word learning
Quine (1960) introduces the problem not in terms of word learning, but
in terms of “radical translation”, his examination of how the language of
a “hitherto untouched people” can be translated. Much of his discussion
focusses on issues which are only tangentially relevant to word learning (such
as how we can understand signs for agreement or disagreement from our
informant) or which are relevant to language learning in general but not to
referential uncertainty (e.g. the order in which types of meaning must be
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learnt). The key passage, referred to implicitly in much of the literature, is
as follows:
“For, consider gavagai. Who knows but what the objects to which
this term applies are not rabbits after all, but mere stages, or
brief temporal segments, of rabbits? In either event the stimulus
situations that prompt assent to Gavagai would be the same as
for Rabbit. Or perhaps the objects to which gavagai applies are
all and sundry undetached parts of rabbits; again the stimulus
meaning would register no di↵erence.” (Quine, 1960, p. 51-52)
Interestingly, Quine never explicitly states that there are an infinite num-
ber of possible meanings for each word at any episode, although this is an
entirely reasonable inference from his discussion of what we referred to ear-
lier as ‘strange’ meanings. Rather, it seems to us that Quine is much more
concerned with the fact that some candidate meanings are in principle al-
ways indistinguishable from a word’s true meaning because they are always
applicable to the same stimuli: “Point to a rabbit and you have pointed to
a stage of a rabbit, to an integral part of a rabbit, to the rabbit fusion, and
to where rabbithood is manifested” (Quine, 1960, p. 52). As we note below,
this renders word learning impossible in principle, if we treat word learning
as a process of eliminating spurious meanings, as theories of cross-situational
learning typically do; in other words, we accept Quine’s central point that, if
two candidate word meanings are always indistinguishable, cross-situational
learning cannot distinguish between them. To escape this conundrum, we
have to assume that some of these indistinguishable meanings (i.e. “rabbit”)
are just more plausible than others (“undetached rabbit parts”). Quine sug-
gests that we can’t assume this a priori, although he acknowledges that in
practice we do rank candidate meanings in terms of plausibility, saying that
the linguist assumes that “the native is enough like us to have a brief gen-
eral term for rabbits ... [and not] for rabbit stages or parts” (p. 52). In
the remainder of this paper, we show that Quine’s intuitions on plausibility
ranking over candidate word meanings solves the problem of word learning
in the face of infinite referential uncertainty, and quantify how weak those
rankings can be.
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4. Model of the learning problem
Following the approach taken by other modelling and experimental work
on cross-situational learning, we characterise the word learning process as
one of eliminating uncertainty about word meaning, and we seek to identify
conditions under which the meaning of a word can be uniquely determined
after multiple exposures. We take an ideal observer approach (Frank and
Tenenbaum, 2011) and consider an optimal cross-situational word learner
attempting to identify the meaning of a single word; we measure time t in
terms of the number of exposures to this word that the ideal learner has
received. Each time the word is uttered, the learner infers (by applying their
battery of word learning heuristics to the situation in which the word is used)
one or more possible discrete meanings for that word drawn from an infinite
set of meanings according to some specified probability distribution. We
make two assumptions regarding the form of this distribution:
Assumption 1: The word’s true meaning, the target meaning, is always
included as one of the inferred meanings.
Assumption 2: All other meanings (the incidental meanings) have some
nonzero probability of not being inferred.
Assumption 1 is often identified as a problem in theories of cross-situational
learning (see e.g. Gleitman, 1990) — although it simplifies our analysis, we
show in Section 6 that word learning is possible if we violate Assumption
1 and allow that the word’s true meaning is not always (or even not often)
inferred.
Assumption 2 corresponds to the requirement that not all possible inci-
dental meanings are inferred on every exposure to a word, which would clearly
render cross-situational learning impossible. Furthermore, it corresponds to
(our reading of) Quine’s concern, discussed above, that some meanings are
in principle indistinguishable from the word’s true meaning: were this the
case, Assumption 2 would be violated for those meanings. We consider this
assumption to be necessary for cross-situational word learning to be possible,
and probably necessary for any theory of word learning which conceives of
learning as a process of converging on a correct meaning at the expense of
all alternatives.
These assumptions about the candidate meanings a learner infers on a
single exposure to a word therefore constitute our model of the learner’s word
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learning heuristics: manipulating the probability distribution over inferred
meanings allows us to simulate learners with very powerful word learning
heuristics (e.g. when the learner always infers the target meaning and a very
small number of incidental meanings) or far weaker heuristics (e.g. where
the number of incidental meanings inferred on any episode is large or even
infinite, due to the learner’s inability to make strong inferences about the
word’s true meaning). Note that, unless we assume that the learner’s heuris-
tics are maximally strong and eliminate all referential uncertainty (i.e. no
incidental meanings are inferred, an extreme version of our Assumption 2),
cross-situational learning still has to do some work: every exposure will fea-
ture multiple candidate meanings, and the target meaning will therefore not
be identifiable on any single exposure.
Our model is agnostic about the source of these constraints on possible
word meanings, but we envisage them as arising through the interplay be-
tween the learner’s word learning heuristics and the (linguistic, social and
physical) context in which a word is used: for instance, on hearing a word, a
learner may assume that it is likely to be a noun given the syntactic context
in which it occurred (Gillette et al., 1999), that it is likely to refer to whole
objects rather than part of an object (Macnamara, 1972), that it is likely
to refer to one of the cluster of objects that the speaker was attending to
(Tomasello and Farrar, 1986), and that, given all the foregoing, it is likely to
refer to the toy that just beeped and flashed in a rather salient manner.
Other than these two assumptions given above, we do not place any re-
strictions on the meanings that are inferred or the relationships between
the inferences that are made within or between exposures. It should be
noted that assuming discrete meanings, as we do here, does not commit us
to any assumptions about the nature of meanings or the relationships be-
tween meanings. For instance, meanings could be interpreted as existing in
a hierarchically- and similarity-structured space, which would be captured
in our model by manipulating the set of incidental meanings associated with
the word’s true meaning and the distribution from which those incidental
meanings are drawn, such that incidental meanings which are related to the
target are more likely to be inferred by the learner, and more general mean-
ings are more likely to be inferred than more specific, restricted meanings.
We return to word learning for such structured meaning spaces in the dis-
cussion. Relatedly, in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 we explore scenarios where there
are correlations between meanings, either within a single exposure (the fact
that one meaning has been being inferred on a given situation could increase,
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or decrease, the probability that other meanings are inferred, for example if
those meanings are related) or across exposures (the inference of a meaning
in one exposure could increase or decrease the probability of its being inferred
in subsequent exposures, for example as a result of the temporal structure of
dialogue).
We assume that our idealised learner uses the full cross-situational learn-
ing strategy defined in e.g. Siskind (1996) or Blythe et al. (2010), whereby
the learner keeps track of the set of meanings that have been inferred in
every exposure up to time t. Due to Assumption 1, the target meaning is
always part of this set; if the sequence of exposures is such that this set com-
prises precisely one meaning (which must be the target meaning), the word
is taken to be learnt. In Section 6, where we relax Assumption 1, we neces-
sarily adopt a less restrictive, and consequently less powerful, conception of
cross-situational learning.
Our model of word learning is sketched in Fig. 1. Given this very simple
model, what are the formal conditions under which word learning is possible
in finite time? Given the standard interpretation of Quine discussed above,
we are particularly interested in scenarios where words can be learned in finite
time despite potentially infinite referential uncertainty. We place no restric-
tions on how small learning times must be: in previous work (Blythe et al.,
2010) we investigated learning times for large lexicons in timescales which
were comparable to those likely to be available for real language learners, but
since here we are concerned with exploring the feasibility of cross-situational
learning in principle, learning in finite time is our only requirement: learning
in practicable timescales, as we explore for the finite meaning case in Blythe
et al. (2010), is an additional constraint and a worthwhile avenue for future
work.
5. Formal conditions for word learning in finite time
5.1. A simple formulation of cross-situational learning
We define the learning time t⇤(✏) that is needed for the meaning of a
word to be uniquely identified with probability 1  ✏, where ✏ is some small
constant. A probabilistic notion of learning time is necessary because it is
always possible to construct an arbitrarily long sequence of exposures where
the target word remains unlearned (e.g. any sequence where the target mean-
ing and one particular incidental meaning are both inferred: such sequences
constitute temporary instances of the problematic case that concerned Quine,
9
Episode! Inferred meanings (∞)! Candidate meanings!
1! = inferred meanings (∞)!
2!
3!
 !
Target word: !
Target meaning: !
Possible incidental !
meanings (∞): !
“horse”!
…!
…!
…! …!
…! …!
→∞ …!
…
!
Figure 1: A sketch of our model of word learning. For every word (here, horse) there is a
target meaning (represented here by the silhouette of a horse) and an infinitely-large set of
possible incidental meanings (represented here by silhouettes of other animals). Learning
consists of a series of episodes; on each episode the learner samples meanings from the set
consisting of the target meaning plus the incidental meaning, with these meanings being
sampled with di↵ering probabilities (e.g. if our Assumptions 1 and 2 are followed, the
target meaning is always sampled, and every incidental meaning has some probability of
not being sampled at any given episode). This sampling procedure represents the process
whereby the learner infers likely word meanings based on their word learning heuristics and
the context in which the target word is used. On the basis of each such learning episode, the
learner updates their set of candidate meanings for the target word: on the first exposure
this will simply be the set of inferred meanings, each of which is equally likely to be the
word’s true meaning; over episodes this set of candidate meanings is winnowed down as
candidates fail to occur in the set of inferred meanings and can therefore be eliminated.
Eventually, if cross-situational learning is possible, the set of candidate meanings will
consist of a single meaning, the target meaning, and the word has been learnt.
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namely where two candidate word meanings cannot be di↵erentiated). The
learning time is finite when the probability of such vexatious sequences is
su ciently small that t⇤(✏) <1 for any arbitrarily small, but nonzero, ✏.
To understand this criterion in more detail, it is helpful to think of a
population of learners, each drawing their own set of inferences of a word’s
meaning from a common distribution. Then, ✏ can be interpreted as the
fraction of all learners who would not have learnt the target word’s meaning
at time t = t⇤(✏). Clearly, if t⇤(✏0) becomes infinite at some finite ✏0, then
some fraction of learners fail to learn the word in a finite amount of time.
Furthermore, once the population size N exceeds 1/✏0, then there is typically
at least one agent in the population who fails to learn the word. Our criterion
thus amounts to insisting that all agents learn the word in a finite amount
of time (although this can be very long), and we consider it preferable to
using other statistics, such as the mean time to learn the word (which can be
infinite, even though every member of the population can learn the word in
a finite amount of time) or the median (which can be finite even when nearly
half the population fail to learn the word in a finite amount of time).
As outlined above, we assume that meanings are discrete, and that there
are infinitely many possible incidental meanings (i.e. there are infinitely
many meanings which could, in principle, be inferred on any occurrence of
the target word). We therefore have a one-to-one mapping between positive
integers m and incidental meanings. We define K(t) as the set of incidental
meanings that have been inferred in every episode up to time t; the word is
learnt when K(t⇤) = ;, i.e. when all incidental meanings have been elimi-
nated, and the word’s true meaning is therefore revealed. The crucial quan-
tity in determining whether the learning time is finite or not is the residual
plausibility of an incidental meaning m, which is defined as follows
pm(t) = Pr [m 2 K(t)|Fm 1 \K(t) = ;] (1)
where Fm is the set of meanings {1, 2, . . . ,m}. In words: the residual plau-
sibility of incidental meaning m at time t is the probability that it is still a
candidate meaning for the word given that the first m 1 incidental meanings
have all been excluded after t exposures. This definition can be applied for
any ordering of the meanings; however it is often convenient to assume that
they are arranged in decreasing order of their probability of being inferred
in any given episode.
Given this definition, we can now state our main results, a formal deriva-
tion of which is given in the Appendix. First, the probability L(t) that the
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word is learnt by time t is simply the probability that all incidental meanings
have been eliminated, i.e. K = ;. We find that this can be written in terms
of the residual plausibilities as
L(t) =
1Y
m=1
[1  pm(t)] (2)
i.e. the probability of learning a word is given by the probability that the
first non-target meaning has been excluded, multiplied by the probability
that the second non-target meaning has been excluded conditioned on the
first being excluded, multiplied by the probability that the third non-target
meaning has been excluded conditioned on the first two being excluded, and
so on down the infinite hierarchy of non-target meanings.
Then, we find that the learning time t(✏) is finite if and only if
lim
t!1
" 1X
m=1
pm(t)
#
= 0 (3)
i.e. learning time is only finite if the residual plausibility of all incidental
meanings reaches 0.
Informally, we can interpret this result as follows: if the combined resid-
ual plausibility of all incidental meanings vanishes in the limit of an infinite
sequence of exposures, the meaning of a word can be identified with arbi-
trarily high probability in a finite time. Blythe et al. (2010) considered cases
where the set of possible incidental meanings was finite: as is made clear in
the formulation above, the learning time in such cases will be finite as long
as there is some probability that each incidental meaning is excluded at any
given exposure, which follows from our Assumption 2. Therefore, under our
assumptions, word learning is always possible when the set of possible inci-
dental meanings is finite. The case of an infinite set of incidental meanings
is best elucidated by means of explicit examples, to which we now turn.
5.2. Learning times given infinite meaning spaces
Let us start by assuming that each incidental meaning m is inferred with
a constant probability am in each exposure, and these inferences are statisti-
cally independent (that is, the probability that both meanings m and m0 are
inferred in any given exposure is just amam0 , and is the same in each episode).
Under such circumstances, the probability that meaning m is inferred in all
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of the first t episodes is atm, and this does not depend on whether any other
meanings (e.g. meanings 1, 2, . . . ,m  1) have been inferred in each of those
t exposures or not. In this case, the residual plausibility of meaning m at
time t is pm(t) = atm. Now, since by our Assumption 2 all am < 1, i.e. all
incidental meanings have some non-zero probability of not being inferred on
any given exposure, it follows that pm(t) ! 0 as t ! 1: that is, every in-
cidental meaning becomes ever more implausible as time goes on. However,
unlike in the case of finite sets of incidental meanings, this does not in itself
guarantee a finite learning time, as we shall now see.
Let us arrange the meanings in decreasing order of their inference prob-
ability, i.e., such that am+1  am. Suppose that, for all incidental meanings,
their probability of being inferred on any given exposure follow a power law:
am = cm  , where c and   are positive constants. c denotes the probability
of inferring the most frequent incidental meaning on any given episode, and
must be less than 1 by our Assumption 2.   denotes the rate of decay of the
power-law distribution: for high  , am decreases rapidly with m (i.e. only
the few most frequent meanings have any substantial probability of being
inferred on any given trial); as   is reduced, the distribution of am flattens
out, such that even lower-ranked meanings have a substantial probability
of being inferred in any episode. Under these conditions, the sum in (3)
converges (i.e. approaches some constant) for any t > 1/  and furthermore
vanishes (i.e. converges to 0) in the limit t!1. Importantly, note that the
rate of decay of the inference probabilities can be very slow, for example, if
  is very close to zero. Indeed, when    1, the mean number of meanings
inferred in each episode is infinite: the infinitely-long tail of meanings, each
with substantial probability of being inferred at each instance of use of the
target word, leads to a situation where the learner is confronted with infi-
nite referential uncertainty; nevertheless, the power-law decay of am is still
su ciently fast for a cross-situational learner to be able to eliminate all non-
target meanings in finite time. This refutes the common intuition, discussed
above, that cross-situational learning cannot work in principle in the face of
infinite referential uncertainty.
This can be illustrated using simulations of cross-situational learning.
Since it is impossible to use an infinite meaning space in a simulation, our
approach here is to vary the number of available meanings,M , and investigate
what happens as M increases (using c = 0.99 and   = 0.01). In Figure 2, we
plot the time at which all but a fraction ✏ of learners have learnt the word:
this time is independent of M for su ciently small ✏.
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Figure 2: Time to learn a word with probability 1   ✏ with confounder frequencies
governed by the power-law am = cm   , with c = 0.99 and   = 0.01. Note that, crucially,
learning times are independent of the number of incidental meanings M , as indicated by
the invariance of learning time as we vary M . For ✏ < 0.01, the learning times are well
approximated by the asymptotic result t⇤(✏) ⇠ ln(✏)/ ln(c). The values of M used in the
simulation are powers of 2: 21 = 2, 24 = 16, 28 = 256 and 224 = 16, 777, 216 (denoted 16M
in the figure).
Note that for the exponent   = 0.01 used in the plot, the mean number
of meanings inferred on any given episode is M1  , i.e., M0.99, meaning that
virtually all meanings that could be inferred are inferred on every instance.
Despite this, if we are only interested in the most laggardly learners, only the
most frequent of these many incidental meanings is relevant to learning time:
by the time the most problematic incidental meaning has been eliminated by
the slowest learner, the other less frequent incidental meanings will also have
been eliminated. The influence of the most frequent confounder on learning
times is a feature of all the cases we consider in this paper. In fact, in the
regime ✏ < 0.01, we find good agreement between our simulation results
and a very crude approximation to (2) in which we consider only the most
frequent confounder, which is inferred on every episode with probability c,
i.e.,
L(t) ⇡ 1  at1 = 1  ct . (4)
Setting this equal to 1  ✏ we obtain an estimate for the learning time t⇤(✏).
Here, we find that that, as ✏ ! 0, t⇤ ⇠ ln(✏)/ ln(c). As can be seen from
Figure 2, the agreement with the numerical data for ✏ < 0.01 is excellent.
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Given that we find that a word can be learnt even when the plausibil-
ity ranking of non-target meanings is very weak, one may legitimately ask
whether it is su cient only for am that decreases to zero as m ! 1 to
guarantee a finite learning time. It turns out that this is not the case. In
the Appendix we provide the example of a set of frequencies that decay log-
arithmically, and find that the word is not necessarily learnt in finite time.
In this case, whether learning times remain small or diverge towards infinity
depends on the size of the set of incidental meanings: for logarithmic de-
cay, it turns out that learning times are determined by the most frequent
confounder, as above, when this set is less than 1018, a vast set of possible
incidental meanings. Only above this size may learning times that diverge as
M is increased become apparent. This example shows that although a cross-
situational learner can in principle fail to learn the meaning of a word in a
finite time when the inference probabilities decay logarithmically, learning is
nevertheless possible unless the number of meanings that may be inferred is
extremely large.
5.3. Correlated meaning inferences within episodes
It is instructive to consider cases where the inference of certain meanings
enhances (or diminishes) the probability that certain other meanings are
inferred: in our simple model of meaning, such correlations between meanings
can be used to capture hierarchical- or similarity-based structure within the
meaning space; as such, cross-situational learning in the presence of such
correlations is an important topic of study. An extreme (but illustrative)
case is where the inference of incidental meaning m on any given episode
implies that all meanings that are more likely to be inferred are also inferred.
If we order the meanings according to decreasing probability of being inferred,
this means that whenever meaning m is inferred, all meanings m0 < m are
also inferred. Conversely, if meaning m is not inferred, all meanings m0 > m
are also not inferred (see next paragraph for the relationship between such
meanings and Quine’s ‘strange’ meanings).
Under this scenario, the residual plausibility of all meanings m > 1 (i.e.
other than the most probable incidental meaning) is zero. This is because if
all meanings m0 < m have been excluded, then meaning m must also have
been excluded. Hence, the probability the word is learnt after time t is just
equal to the probability that the most probable incidental meaning has been
excluded. All that is needed for a finite learning time is for this probability to
approach unity as t ! 1. These within-episode correlations therefore lead
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to faster learning than when meanings within a single episode are statisti-
cally independent. More generally, any incidental meaningm whose inference
implies the inference of a (necessarily more plausible) meaning has residual
plausibility pm(t) = 0, and can therefore be ignored for the purposes of com-
puting learning times. All such shadowed meanings are therefore invisible to
a cross-situational learner. Quine’s ‘strange’ meanings seem excellent candi-
dates for shadowed meanings: if “undetached rabbit parts” is inferred, then
“rabbit” would necessarily also be inferred and would be more plausible.
What about weaker within-episode correlations, which do not produce
shadowed meanings? Learning times here should be somewhat similar to
the case where each incidental meaning is statistically independent of any
other, since weakening of within-episode correlations gradually approaches
this statistically independent case. While we do not have a general formation
for these weak-correlation scenarios, we can investigate numerically. There
are of course a large number of ways that we could construct such meaning
spaces. We use a simple Markov chain model, in which meaning 1 is inferred
with probability c, and then meaning m > 1 is inferred with probability pm
if meaning m  1 is inferred, or with probability qm if meaning m  1 is not
inferred. Specifically, we choose
pm =
(1  ↵)(m  1)  + ↵c
m 
and qm =
↵c
m 
(5)
so that the probability that any particular meaning m is inferred is cm  ,
as previously. However, given that a meaning m is inferred, there is an
increased likelihood that meanings with a similar plausibility are inferred,
depending on ↵. Specifically, if ↵ = 1, pm = qm, which means that each
meaning is inferred independently of any other meaning, which is the special
case we treated before. On the other hand, as ↵! 0, the probability pm ! 1
as m ! 1, which means that long strings of infrequent meanings appear
together in this limit.
As anticipated, we find that the learning time t⇤(✏) is largely una↵ected by
the presence of correlations, even for small values of ↵, as shown in Figure 3.
In particular, we find the same approximation that captured the behaviour
of the statistically-independent case, t⇤(✏) ⇠ ln(✏)/ ln(c) as ln(✏) ! 0, also
works well here: even when within-episode correlations are present, the slow-
est learners are those who retain the most plausible confounding meaning as
an alternative hypothesis for an extended time.
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Figure 3: Time to learn a word with probability 1 ✏ with confounder frequencies governed
by the power-law with c = 0.99 and   = 0.01. Meanings are correlated so that strings
of neighbouring meanings are likely to appear, the degree of correlation being determined
by ↵. As in Fig. 2, learning time is independent of the number of incidental meanings,
M . Furthermore, learning time is largely una↵ected by correlations between meanings,
as can be seen by comparing the upper and lower panels of this figure (within-episode
correlations are substantially stronger in the lower panel), and indeed by comparing this
figure to Fig. 2 (where there are no within-episode correlations): any di↵erences from the
uncorrelated case (Fig. 2) are confined to the large-✏ regime.
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5.4. Correlated meaning inferences across episodes
Inferences mighty also be correlated in time: a meaning being inferred
in one episode may enhance (or diminish) its probability of being inferred
in the next episode, which would seem likely given that words are used in
dialogues where certain themes and linguistic constructions recur (Pickering
and Garrod, 2004). With such correlations, one can typically associate a
timescale ⌧ after which the correlation has decayed. In this case, we would
simply expect all learning timescales to be increased by a factor of order ⌧ .
This does not a↵ect whether the learning time is infinite or not, unless ⌧
itself is infinite.
6. Failure to infer the target meaning: relaxing Assumption 1
In the foregoing models, we assumed that the word’s true meaning, the
target meaning, was inferred at every episode (our Assumption 1). While
this significantly simplifies the formal analysis of cross-situational learning,
it turns out (contra e.g. Gleitman, 1990) not to be necessary for word learning
to be possible. Rather, what is required is that the target meaning is the most
likely to be inferred whenever the word is uttered: given enough exposures,
this meaning will have been inferred more times than any arbitrarily high-
probability incidental meaning, and a learner who identifies the meaning
which is most strongly associated with the target word will learn the word
(as discussed in, e.g., Smith et al., 2011). Therefore, cross-situational word
learning is possible as long as learners employ heuristics that reliably lead
to the target meaning being the most plausible (over many episodes, not
necessarily in any given episode).
In order to show that this is the case, we relax our Assumption 1: rather
than always being inferred, we assume that the target meaning is inferred
with probability c0, and the probability of the incidental meanings decays
according to a power law as before, with the probability of themth incidental
meaning being inferred on any episode being am = c0m  , m ranging from 2
(for the most plausible incidental meaning) to infinity. c0 = 1 corresponds to
our standard model, where Assumption 1 is met and the target meaning is
always inferred; c0 < 1 corresponds to cases where Assumption 1 is violated
and the target meaning is not always inferred, including cases (for c0 < 0.5)
where it is not inferred on the majority of exposures. Due to the power-law
decay, regardless of the value of c0, all incidental meanings are less likely to
be inferred than the target meaning.
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In order for the word’s true meaning to be identifiable despite the pos-
sibility of the target meaning being absent on one or more exposures, we
have to relax our model of cross-situational learning somewhat. Under these
circumstances, a strictly eliminative cross-situational learner would be forced
to conclude that the target word had no meaning, since for every meaning
(including the target meaning) there will be episodes where that meaning
is not inferred. Instead, we assume a less strict form of cross-situational
learning. Learners maintain a single candidate hypothesis about the word’s
meaning, which they revise after each exposure. If the candidate meaning is
included in the set of meanings selected at exposure i, it is retained; other-
wise, the single most frequent meaning included in the current exposure is
selected as the new candidate (i.e. the meaning which has co-occurred most
frequently, but not necessarily always, with the target word); in the event
that there are multiple equally-frequent meanings, one is selected at random.
In Blythe et al. (2010) we term a related form of cross-situational learning,
where new candidate meanings are selected proportionally to their frequency
of occurrence, Approximate cross-situational learning, to distinguish it from
the maximally-strict eliminative form of cross-situational learning, and also
from other forms of cross-situational which make less use of cross-situational
statistics (e.g. the Minimal strategy from Blythe et al. 2010; Propose but
Verify from Trueswell et al. 2013).
As can be seen in Fig. 4, the target word can still be learnt even if the
target meaning is not reliably inferred (e.g. c0 < 1) or even if it is not
usually inferred (c0 < 0.5) — the less reliably the target is inferred, the
slower learning becomes, but since the target meaning is still the single most
probable meaning, eventually the cross-situational statistics will allow the
learner to identify the correct meaning. In other words, cross-situational
learning will be possible as long as the learner’s heuristics ensure that the
target meaning is the most likely to be inferred in the long run, even when the
target meaning is never unambiguously provided and even when the target
meaning is often not inferred.
7. Discussion
We make two central assumptions in our initial model: that the tar-
get meaning is always inferred (our Assumption 1), and that all incidental
meanings have some non-zero probability of not being inferred, i.e. unlike
the target meaning, they are not always inferred (our Assumption 2). As we
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Figure 4: Proportion of 10,000 simulation runs in which the target word is learnt after
a given number of exposures, with meaning frequencies governed by the power-law with
various values of c0, denoting the probability that the target meaning will be inferred
on any given episode: c0 = 1 corresponds to the case where the target is always inferred
(satisfying our Assumption 1); learning is slower but still possible for c0 < 1, corresponding
to cases where the target meaning is not inferred on every trial, including for cases where
c0 < 0.5, i.e. where the target meaning is not inferred on the majority of trials. These
results are for M=100; results for larger M are qualitatively similar.
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show in Section 6, Assumption 1 is not required for cross-situational word
learning to be possible: words can be learnt despite potentially infinite refer-
ential uncertainty even if a word’s true meaning is not always, or not often,
inferred. Our second assumption embodies Quine’s observation, which we
take to be necessary for any model of word learning, that incidental mean-
ings which are in principle indistinguishable from the target meaning will
block learning.
We have focussed here on the learning of a single word, but the same
techniques can be extended to the learning of large lexicons, using the tech-
niques presented in our previous work (Blythe et al., 2010; Reisenauer et al.,
2013): in particular, Reisenauer et al. (2013) consider the case where words
are not learnt independently, such that learning one word can facilitate the
learning of another, through the Mutual Exclusivity constraint.
Our idealised learner in our initial model employs the most powerful form
of cross-situational learning possible, tracking the set of meanings which have
consistently co-occurred with the target word. In Section 6, we consider a
weaker form of cross-situational learning, where learners track not the ever-
present set of word meanings, but simply maintain some estimate of the fre-
quency of candidate word meanings. Still weaker versions of cross-situational
learning are possible, and indeed seem to better characterise human cross-
situational learning in some scenarios (Medina et al., 2011; Trueswell et al.,
2013): for instance, learners might simply retain a single preferred candidate
meaning across exposures, persisting with or rejecting this hypothesis in the
light of each exposure. We have previously shown, for the case of finite sets of
incidental meanings, that weaker strategies tend to increase the time required
to learn a lexicon, without introducing any qualitative shift in the conditions
under which cross-situational learning is possible (Blythe et al., 2010). While
exploring these mechanisms for the case of infinite meaning spaces is an area
for future work, we expect that the picture presented here will in general
hold: in particular, details of the exact cross-situational procedure applied
are unlikely to influence whether learning time is finite or not.
Our treatment of meaning is rather minimal: meanings are simply dis-
crete values drawn from a potentially infinite set. This extremely general
treatment allows us to abstract away from any particular theory of word
meaning, and as we mention when introducing the model, we expect that
this same approach could be implemented in such a way that meanings could
naturally be interpreted as being drawn from a hierarchically- and similarity-
structured space, by manipulating the set of incidental meanings associated
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with the word’s true meaning and the distribution from which those inciden-
tal meanings are drawn, such that incidental meanings which are related to
the target are more likely to be inferred by the learner, and more general
meanings are overall more likely to be inferred than more specific, restricted
meanings. Note that, in the latter case, the cross-situational learner still
requires it to be the case that the word’s true meaning is the most likely to
be inferred (see next paragraph) — biases such as a size principle (Tenen-
baum, 1999) or Mutual Exclusivity, which we take to be part of the learner’s
heuristics, would be required to ensure that words with specific, restricted
meanings could be successfully learnt. Verifying that this is the case would
be a valuable addition to the initial model we outline here.
All of the models outlined above assume that a word’s true meaning is the
most likely meaning to be inferred on any one exposure (although it may not
actually be inferred), and therefore, averaged over many exposures, will be
the most frequently inferred meaning for that word, allowing cross-situational
learning to take place. This assumption bears some discussion. Firstly, we
have assumed in our models that the probability distribution over the target
and incidental meanings remains constant over the course of learning, but this
is not necessarily the case. For instance, for some word meanings which rely
on learning a priori more probable meanings first and then applying Mutual
Exclusivity, the target meaning may only be learnable once the learning of
other words re-orders the plausibility of candidate meanings such that the
target meaning becomes the most plausible remaining meaning. In other
words, we expect that word learning will still be possible if the target word
is eventually the most plausible. Secondly, the fact that words are socially
learned and culturally transmitted provides some guarantee that the types
of meanings learners tend to infer will indeed be the types of meanings that
words come to have: a range of computational and experimental work shows
that languages adapt to the biases of language learners as a result of their
repeated learning and transmission (e.g. Kirby, 2000; Gri ths and Kalish,
2007; Kirby et al., 2008): while the structure of the environment also feeds in
to this process (Perfors and Navarro, 2014), we should therefore expect that
word meanings will become adapted to the heuristics that learners use to
infer them; in the limiting case, a word whose meaning could not be inferred
by learners would be guaranteed to change in meaning. While the process
by which languages become adapted to the biases of language learners has
been well studied in the general case, explicit models of the process for word
learning would be worthwhile.
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Finally, to reiterate: although the results we present results require that,
in the long run, the word’s true meaning is the most likely to be inferred,
there is still substantial work for cross-situational learning to do. Firstly,
although the learner is more likely to infer the word’s true meaning than any
other, they still face substantial or indeed infinite referential uncertainty: on
any given exposure, the target meaning is merely one of an infinite number of
inferred meanings, and cross-situational learning is required to eliminate this
uncertainty. Secondly, as we show in Section 6, the target meaning does not
have to be reliably inferred to be learnt. Cross-situational learning therefore
turns an apparently impossible learning problem — inferring the meaning
of a word from a series of exposures where each exposure o↵ers infinitely
many candidate meanings, possibly not including the true meaning — into
a tractable one.
8. Conclusions
We have established a very general formal foundation for the study of
cross-situational learning, obtaining an exact expression for the probability,
L(t) that a word is learnt after t exposures by an ideal cross-situational
learner, valid for an arbitrary distribution of incidental meanings. We have
also established criteria for when this learning time is finite, i.e. cross-
situational learning is possible, based on the residual plausibility of an in-
cidental meaning. When confounding meanings are inferred independently,
the learning time is well estimated by the asymptotic formula t⇤ = ln ✏/ ln c,
where c is the frequency of the most common incidental meaning. This ap-
proximation also works well when there are within-episode correlations be-
tween inferred meanings. Importantly for the debate in the cognitive sciences
over word learning in the face of infinite uncertainty, we have identified at
least one scenario in which referential uncertainty at every exposure is infi-
nite, yet learning times are still finite. This finding suggests that the common
intuition, that cross-situational learning is impossible in such circumstances,
is incorrect. Furthermore, we show that cross-situational learning is possible
even if the learner’s heuristics only impose very weak constraints on the plau-
sibility ranking of possible meanings and even when the word’s true meaning
is not always (or even not often) inferred. This work therefore suggests
that word learning heuristics can in principle be far weaker than previously
suggested and still allow word learning, and therefore suggests that weaker,
unreliable, probabilistic heuristics can play an important role; exploring such
23
biases in real word learners is therefore a worthwhile empirical aim.
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Appendix A. Derivation of the main result
Here we show that Equations (1) and (3) and the statement that a word
can be learnt in a finite time are equivalent. We recall that K(t) is the set of
confounding meanings that have appeared in every episode until time t and
that FM comprises the first M meanings. We introduce
LM(t) = Pr [FM \K(t) = ;] , (A.1)
the probability that the first M meanings have all failed to appear at least
once in the first t episodes. From the definition of conditional probability,
LM(t) = Pr [M 62 K(t)|FM 1 \K(t) = ;] Pr [FM 1 \K(t) = ;]
= [1  pM(t)]LM 1(t) (A.2)
where pM(t) is given by Eq. (1). This is valid for all M > 0 if we take
L0(t) = 1 for all t. Hence,
LM(t) =
MY
m=1
[1  pm(t)] . (A.3)
The probability that the target meaning has been disambiguated from all
other meanings is
L(t) = lim
M!1
LM(t) ⌘
1Y
m=1
[1  pm(t)] . (A.4)
Since pm(t) is a probability, and lies between zero and one, this infinite
product exists (and furthermore itself lies between zero and one).
We are interested in the case where L⇤ = limt!1 L(t) = 1, since this
corresponds to the word having a finite learning time. This fact follows
straightforwardly from the definition of a limit, which is that for any ✏ suf-
ficiently small, there exists a t⇤ such that L(t) > 1   ✏ for all t > t⇤. The
smallest t⇤ for which this is true for any given ✏ corresponds to the learning
time t⇤(✏) defined in the main text.
To show that (3) is a necessary and su cient condition for a finite learning
time, our strategy is as follows. We shall first assume that (3) is true, and
will then find that this implies L⇤ = 1, and the learning time is finite. We
then then consider the case where (3) does not hold, and find that L⇤ < 1 as
a consequence, and hence that the learning time is infinite.
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In the first instance, where (3) is assumed, it follows that, for su ciently
large t, we have maxm{pm(t)} arbitrarily small, and in particular less than
unity. We can then take the logarithm of (A.4) and expand as a power series
to obtain the convergent double series
lnL(t) =  
1X
m=1
1X
k=1
pm(t)k
k
. (A.5)
Since all terms in this double series have the same sign, the order of the
summation indices can be exchanged, and the resulting double series
ln J(t) =  
1X
k=1
1X
m=1
pm(t)k
k
(A.6)
has the same limit: L(t) = J(t) (Scott and Tims, 1966). (By contrast, if
either of these double series diverges, then so does the other).
Using the fact that
1X
m=1
pm(t)
k 
 1X
m=1
pm(t)
!k
(A.7)
we find
lnL(t) = ln J(t)    
1X
k=1
1
k
" 1X
m=1
pm(t)
#k
= ln
"
1 
1X
m=1
pm(t)
#
(A.8)
where the second equality follows because it is assumed at the outset thatP1
m=1 pm(t) converges to a value smaller than unity. Exponentiating both
sides, we finally obtain the inequality
L(t)   1 
1X
m=1
pm(t) . (A.9)
Since the condition (3) states that the series on the right-hand side of the
previous expression vanishes as t ! 1, we have that L⇤   1. However, L⇤
cannot exceed unity: hence L⇤ = 1 and the condition (3) is su cient for a
finite learning time.
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We now show that (3) is also a necessary condition, i.e., that if (3) does
not hold, the learning time is infinite. We consider again (A.6), and find that
ln J(t) =  
1X
k=1
1
k
1X
m=1
pm(t)
k   
1X
m=1
pm(t) . (A.10)
Now, if (3) does not hold, we must have the strict inequality
lim
t!1
ln J(t) < 0 . (A.11)
If the sum for ln J(t) converges for su ciently large t, we have that L(t) =
J(t), and hence L⇤ < 1 when (3) does not hold. Hence, the learning time
becomes infinite at some nonzero ✏ in this case. On the other hand, if the
sum for ln J(t) diverges at all finite times, so does the sum for lnL(t), which
implies that L⇤ = 0, which again indicates an infinite learning time.
Appendix B. The case of logarithmic decay
In the text we discuss the situation where inference frequencies decay
logarithmically, e.g., am = c ln 2/ ln(m + 1), and mention that under this
scenario the word is not necessarily learnt in finite time. By applying the
integral test, one finds that the sum in (3) diverges at any time t <1, which
in turn implies that the learning time diverges for any ✏ < 1.
The way in which the learning time diverges in this example turns out to
be quite subtle and somewhat revealing. Suppose we keep only the first M
confounding meanings. Then, from (2) we have
L(t)  exp
 
 [c ln 2]t
MX
m=1
1
[ln(m+ 1)]t
!
(B.1)
since ln(1   x) <  x. Replacing the sum with an integral, and making the
change of variable u = lnm we find
L(t)  exp
 
 [c ln 2]t
Z ln(M+2)
ln(2)
eu
ut
du
!
. (B.2)
When u is small, the exponential contribution to the integrand changes
slowly, while the power-law part changes rapidly. This means that the inte-
gral is weakly dependent on M while it remains below some characteristic
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Figure B.5: Time to learn a word with probability 1   ✏ with confounder frequencies
governed by a logarithm an = c
ln(2)
ln(n+1) , with c = 0.9. Here the data for di↵erent sizes
of the space of confounders, M , are indistinguishable except very close to ✏ = 1. The
learning times are close to the asymptotic result t⇤(✏) ⇠ ln(✏)/ ln(c) even though formally
in the limit M !1 the learning time diverges for all ✏.
value. In this regime, one can set eu = 2 (its value at the lower end of the
integral), and finds that the integral apparently converges toZ ln(M+2)
ln(2)
2
ut
du =
2
t  1
1
(ln 2)t 1
 
1 

ln 2
ln(M + 2)
 t 1!
(B.3)
which remains finite in the limit M ! 1. From this, one can estimate the
behaviour of the learning time as ✏! 0 as t⇤(✏) = ln(✏)/ ln(c), which as pre-
viously is governed purely by the frequency of the most common confounder.
Numerical data (not shown) shown in Figure B.5 correspond well with this
estimate.
The integrand eu/ut has a minimum at u = t. This provides an estimate
of the value of u at which we can no longer regard eu as constant, and at
which the integral begins to diverge. The estimate of t⇤ obtained above is
therefore only valid if u < t⇤ across the whole range of the integral, and in
particular at the top end u ⇡ ln(M). For this model we therefore find that
the learning time will be apparently finite if M < (✏)1/ ln(c). For the case
✏ = 0.01 and c = 0.9, we would need to consider at least 1018 confounding
meanings before probing the region where the integral diverges.
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